{"insight":{"id":"117694344","lede":"Broadly, this paper suggests that the construction of the welfare state is not just a result of public attitudes, but that those attitudes are also shaped by the institutional design of the welfare state. Universal programs build broader support.","slug":"the-more-inclusive-welfare-programs-are-the-more-political-support-they-generate","title":"The more inclusive welfare programs are, the more political support they generate.","showTitleAsQuote":false,"epistemicStatus":"empirical","reports":[{"id":"19519421","title":"Basic Income","slug":"basic-income"},{"id":"74233776","title":"Social Wealth Fund","slug":"social-wealth-fund"}],"tags":[{"slug":"universalism","name":"Universalism","id":"101707811","lede":"

One of the defining conflicts of economic discourse today is the debate over whether government programs should be 'targeted' to particular demographics - such as stimulus payments only going to those who earn less than $75,000 per year - or if they should be 'universal', provided to all citizens (and taxed to adjust distribution afterwards).

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Universal programs boast the virtue of simplicity, while carrying the burden of size. Universal programs require far less bureaucracy, since no determination of who is eligible for payments is required. Advocates suggest that society can still tailor the distributional effects of universal programs by taxing 'on the backend'. But universal programs thus carry significantly higher gross costs, and require greater disbursement of public funds up front.

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Targeted programs effectively 'tax on the frontend', adjusting the distribution of a program before giving it out. Thus, they have smaller price tags, but require more complex infrastructure to keep track of eligibility and adjust accordingly.

\n","ledeExcerpt":"One of the defining conflicts of economic discourse today is the debate over whether government programs should be 'targeted' to particular demographics - such as stimulus payments only going to those who earn less than $75,000 per year - or if they should be 'universal', provided to all citizens.\n\nUniversal programs boast the virtue of simplicity, while carrying the burden of size. Universal programs require far less bureaucracy, since no determination of who is eligible for payments is required. Advocates suggest that society can still tailor the distributional effects of universal programs by taxing 'on the backend'. But universal programs thus carry significantly higher gross costs, and require greater disbursement of public funds up front.\n\nTargeted programs effectively 'tax on the frontend', adjusting the distribution of a program before giving it out. Thus, they have smaller price tags, but require more complex infrastructure to keep track of eligibility and adjust accordingly.","featured":true},{"slug":"policy-design-details","name":"Policy Design Details","id":"100414960","lede":"

The details of a policy can fundamentally transform its effects. For example, a basic income that replaces all other welfare appeals greatly to conservatives and libertarians, while one that supplements the existing welfare state appeals to progressives.

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To evaluate any policy in full, we must know the details of its implementation.

\n","ledeExcerpt":"The details of a policy can fundamentally transform its effects. For example, a basic income that replaces all other welfare appeals greatly to conservatives and libertarians, while one that supplements the existing welfare state appeals to progressives.\n\nTo evaluate any policy in full, we must know the details of its implementation.","featured":true},{"slug":"implementation","name":"Implementation","id":"69609492","lede":"","ledeExcerpt":"","featured":true}],"sources":[{"id":"117694339","lede":"How does the structure of social policy institutions shape the level of public support for the welfare state? The policy feedback literature predicts that highly inclusive welfare institutions generate larger bases of public support by shifting the focus away from redistribution and toward common market insecurities felt across classes, while more selective strategies erode support by highlighting the conflicts of interest imbedded in clearly redistributive social programs. This paper expands on existing research by adopting a disaggregated approach to measuring both welfare state structure and public support, uncovering important cross-program variations in public attitudes and welfare state design masked by traditional measures of universality and public support. This project applies this method to public opinion data in 17 advanced capitalist democracies across three policy areas: healthcare, pensions, and unemployment. The findings offer evidence of policy feedback effects.","link":"https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0958928712471224","slug":"policy-feedback-and-support-for-the-welfare-state","kind":"Article","title":"Policy Feedback and Support For the Welfare State","year":"2013-01-01","researchers":[{"id":"117694338","location":"Drew University, Associate Professor","name":"Jason Jordan","seoDescription":"","slug":"jason-jordan"}]}]}}