From the perspective of large corporations, codetermination may be a more preferable measure to lessen their power than alternatives, such as higher tax rates, or being split into several smaller corporations.

“The relatively soft constraint imposed by codetermination becomes especially apparent if one considers other mechanisms that the U.S. Congress has used or could use to tame concentrations of private power. For example, we suspect that if choosing between a marginal income tax rate of 94% (the tax rate imposed upon the highest earners from 1944 to 1945) and codetermination, most of the country’s entrepreneurs, scholars, and wealthy citizens would view the latter as less disruptive. Similarly, we suspect that America’s largest corporations, such as Amazon or Facebook, would prefer codetermination to suffering the fate of Standard Oil: that is, to be split into several smaller corporations. General size limits also can be highly disruptive, potentially eliminating network benefits and economies of scale.”